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Abstract In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s 
distinction between data and phenomena which pursues two objectives. First, I aim to 
clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because 
despite its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s 
distinction has to be understood. I reject one common interpretation of the distinction, 
endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phe-
nomena with patterns in data sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of 
Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not specify the relationship between phenome-
na and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a con-
textual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are 
states of affairs which play specific roles in scientific practice and to which we adopt a 
special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance of Bo-
gen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists 
and constructive empiricists. Contrary to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue 
that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive empir-
icism. 
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1. Introduction 
In their seminal paper Saving the Phenomena James Bogen and James Wood-
ward attack  philosophical  models  of  science  according  to  which  scientific  
theories predict and explain observable facts, which in turn provide evidence 
for or against those theories. They argue that a closer look at scientific practice 
reveals that one should better distinguish between data, which are the observed 
outcomes of measurements, and phenomena, which are explained and predict-
ed by theories but have to be inferred from data. Bogen and Woodward take it 
to be a serious shortcoming of most philosophical accounts of science that they 
do not take this difference into account. 
In this paper I scrutinize how exactly the distinction between data and phe-
nomena has to be understood and what its philosophical impact is. So, the aim 
of my discussion is twofold. First, I try to provide some conceptual clarifica-
tion. I seek to answer the question what exactly is meant when something is 
described as a phenomenon. I argue that several ways of understanding the 
notion, which are endorsed in the philosophical literature, are not appropriate 
to capture its meaning. In particular there seems to be no unambiguous inter-
pretation of the distinction between data and phenomena. Therefore, I will 
make a proposal how the notion of a scientific phenomenon and Bogen and 
Woodward’s distinction are understood best. En passant I will argue that in the 
light of this proposal an objection Bruce Glymour (2000) has raised against 
Bogen and Woodward turns out to be misguided. 
Second, I want to evaluate Bogen and Woodward’s claim that the non-
consideration of the data–phenomena-distinction is a serious shortcoming of 
traditional philosophical accounts of science. If this thesis is correct Bogen and 
Woodward’s distinction should shed some new light on problems we encoun-
ter in philosophy of science. Of course, in a short paper like the one at hand I 
cannot generally assess whether it does so or not. Rather the second aim of the 
paper is more modest. I only try to show that Bogen and Woodward’s thesis 
does not hold in one particular case. I argue that the data– phenomena-
distinction is of no philosophical importance for the debate between scientific 
realists and constructive empiricists. Bogen and Woodward attempt to show 
that this central issue in contemporary philosophy of science is a prime exam-
ple where their distinction displays its philosophical value by providing an 
argument against constructive empiricism. I will argue to the contrary: the 
data–phenomena-distinction does not force us to take any different point of 
view within this important epistemological debate. 
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My paper’s structure is as follows: In Sect. 2 I identify two conceptual features 
which are characteristic for the notion of a phenomenon in scientific parlance. 
Section 3 deals with the traditional empiricist view of scientific phenomena 
and James Bogen and James Woodward’s critique of it which is based on their 
distinction between data and phenomena. In Sect. 4 I argue that despite its 
intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how this distinction has to be under-
stood. I reject one widespread interpretation of it which I call the pattern view 
of scientific phenomena. In Sect. 5 I point out that other interpretations of Bo-
gen and Woodward’s distinction also suffer from obscurities. In order to avoid 
these unclarities I propose a contextual understanding of scientific phenomena. 
Finally, in Sect. 6 I evaluate the philosophical significance of Bogen and 
Woodward’s distinction with respect to van Fraassen’s constructive empiri-
cism. 
2. Conceptual features of the notion of a scientific  
phenomenon in scientific parlance 
The expression “phenomenon” is a common part of scientists’ vocabulary. 
Consider for example the following two statements taken from a recent issue 
of Nature. 
In the phenomenon known as the Aharonov-Bohm effect, magnetic forces 
seem to act on charged particles such as electrons—even though the particles 
do not cross any magnetic field lines. Is this evidence for electromagnetic 
forces that work in new and unsuspected ways? Tonomura and Nori (2008, p. 
298) 
The presence of a liquid-gas transition was noted to be very remarkable be-
cause there are few, if any, other experimentally known instances in localized 
spin systems. […] No mechanism was known to account for this phenome-
non, and our theory of magnetic monopoles fills this gap. Castelnovo et al. 
(2008, p. 44) 
I take these statements to be typical examples for scientists’ talk about phe-
nomena.
1
 Therefore, it is possible to extract general characteristics of the no-
tion from them: each statement points to a specific role, which phenomena 
play in scientific practice. Those roles can be stated as follows: 
                                                             
1 That these statements really are such typical examples is of course an empirical hypothesis. But 
I think it is easy to persuade oneself from its correctness, e.g., by typing the word “phenomenon” 
into the online search of databases of scientific journals and reading through the hits. 
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(a) Phenomena are potential evidence for scientific theories (first quotation) 
and 
(b) phenomena are potential explananda of scientific theories (second quota-
tion).
2
 
These two roles provide the starting point for my further discussion. In the 
following two sections I examine two philosophical proposals for the explica-
tion of the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Those proposals spell out the 
notion by invoking epistemic criteria; that means they restrict its usage to enti-
ties about which we gain knowledge in specific ways. But as it will turn out, 
those proposals fail at specifying the notion in way that respects its yet identi-
fied characteristic features. 
Of course, such a line of argumentation presupposes that the criticized pro-
posals are descriptive approaches, i.e., that these proposals are intended to 
analyze the notion of a phenomenon as it is used by scientists. Obviously, if 
those proposals were rather meant as stipulative approaches, which use the 
expression “phenomenon” as a technical term with a meaning stipulated exclu-
sively for a certain philosophical theory, my argumentation would be pointless. 
For this reason I will have to point out in the next section why the discussed 
proposals and in particular Bogen and Woodward’s account of phenomena 
should be understood as attempts to illuminate what scientists mean when they 
describe something as a phenomenon. 
3. Traditional accounts of science and the distinction  
between data and phenomena 
The historical roots of the expression “phenomenon” as a part of the scientific 
vocabulary can be traced back to the ancient astronomical research program 
called ‘saving the phenomena’. Here the observed motions of the celestial bod-
ies where denoted as “phenomena” (cf. Mittelstrass 1961). Ancient astronomi-
cal theories should account for these motions without violating the principles 
of Greek natural philosophy. A generalization of this conception of phenome-
na, which I call the traditional view of scientific phenomena, can also be found 
in contemporary philosophy of science. The traditional view identifies phe-
nomena with the observable structures and processes of the world. Such a view 
                                                             
2 One might wonder why I added the qualification “potential” in (a) and (b), but the reason for 
this is simple. In many cases scientists encounter a phenomenon while possessing neither a 
theory to explain it nor one for which the phenomenon provides evidence, but are rather in 
search for such theories. Nevertheless we want to say that those scientists encountered a phe-
nomenon. 
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is typically held by empiricists like Pierre Duhem (1969) or Bas van Fraassen 
(1980). Both claim that it is the aim of science ‘to save the phenomena’, there-
by explicitly echoing the name of the ancient research program. Saving the 
phenomena means for van Fraassen that scientific theories should make true 
statements about the observable structures and processes of the world, but we 
cannot and need not know whether what our theories say about the unobserva-
ble parts of the world is true or not. So, according to the traditional view the 
criterion for being a phenomenon is an epistemic one, namely that we can 
acquire knowledge about it by observation. Closely connected with the tradi-
tional view is a conception of science according to which science can be mod-
eled as consisting out of two parts: an observational basis and a theoretical 
superstructure. The observational basis confirms theories and the theories in 
turn allow for explanation and prediction of observable phenomena. 
James Bogen and James Woodward (1988) challenge this dyadic picture by 
introducing the distinction between data and phenomena into the philosophical 
discourse (cf. also Bogen and Woodward 1992, 2003; Woodward 1989, 2000). 
According to Bogen and Woodward the phenomena of science are typically 
unobservable. We rather have to infer them from reliable scientific data. Scien-
tific theories, in turn, do not explain and predict observed data but inferred 
phenomena. 
Bogen and Woodward characterize data and phenomena in the following ways: 
Data are perceivable and public accessible records of measurement outcomes. 
They are, as they put it, “idiosyncratic” (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 317), 
which means that they are bound to specific experimental contexts and typical-
ly do not occur outside of scientists’ laboratories. Furthermore, data result 
from complex causal interactions in such a way that it is usually not possible to 
construct theories which explain or predict their occurrence. Phenomena, in 
turn, are not idiosyncratic. They rather are “stable and general features of the 
world” (Woodward 1989, p. 393), for which our theories should account. The 
very same phenomenon can often be detected via different experimental meth-
ods, while those methods yield different kinds of data. Bogen and Woodward 
criticize traditional accounts of science for leaving out these important differ-
entiations and plead for a modification of traditional conceptions of science: 
the dyad of theory and observation should be replaced by a triad of data, phe-
nomena and theories. 
To exemplify the main idea let us briefly consider their notorious example for 
a phenomenon: the melting point of lead. Scientists do not determine the melt-
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ing point of lead by liquefying one sample of lead and observing an individual 
thermometer reading of the melting temperature. Instead they perform a series 
of measurements and even when the measuring device functions properly and 
systematic errors can be excluded the various individual thermometer readings 
(i.e., the data) in this measurement series will differ slightly from one another. 
In order to explain this one assumes that the measurement results were deter-
mined as well by the ‘true melting point’ as by numerous small and contingent 
‘errors’, which cannot be adequately controlled and which often remain even 
unknown. If we can assure that those errors are independent from one another, 
have the same variance and are leading with equal probability to an increase as 
to a decrease of the measured value we are justified in claiming that the data 
are normally distributed and that the arithmetic mean is a good estimate for the 
‘true value’. The establishment of the phenomenon that the melting point of 
lead is, say, 327.46 ± 0.04◦C therefore involves various levels of data analysis 
and inference. Consequently, the melting point of lead is nothing we observe at 
all; rather this fact has to be inferred from observed data mainly on the basis of 
statistical inference. 
At the end of Sect. 2 I introduced a distinction between descriptive and stipula-
tive approaches and pointed out that I take Bogen and Woodward as pursuing 
the former type of account. Having introduced Bogen and Woodward’s dis-
tinction in this section I am now in a position to make clear why I think that 
the framework they provide should be understood in this manner. First, the 
ways Bogen and Woodward characterize phenomena seem to be not only co-
herent with scientists’ usage of the notion, but even explicitly motivated by the 
fact that what scientists regard as phenomena often differs from how philoso-
phers conceptualize scientific phenomena in their accounts. Second, Bogen 
and Woodward do not explicitly attempt to give a definition of the term “phe-
nomenon”, which is something one would suspect if the expression was used 
as a stipulated technical term. Third, the descriptive understanding fits general 
developments in philosophy of science. Nowadays descriptive approaches are 
regarded as more successful than stipulative ones. Just think of the notorious 
debate about the nature of theories. There we try to find out what theories are 
particularly by investigating which kinds of objects scientists describe as such. 
We regard it for example as a shortcoming of the syntactic view that it does 
not apply to things to which scientists’ routinely refer as a theory, e.g., Dar-
winian evolutionary theory. If we accept that such descriptive strategies are the 
most successful means of philosophical investigation the principle of charity 
also suggests to take Bogen and Woodward as proponents of such a strategy. 
[7] 
 
For these three reasons I take it that the data–phenomena-distinction is really 
meant to illuminate the concept of phenomena (and the concept of data as 
well) as we find it in scientific parlance. 
4. The pattern view of scientific phenomena and the  
detection of extrasolar planets 
If the traditional identification of phenomena with observable structures and 
processes is misguided in the way Bogen and Woodward claim, how can we 
then specify what phenomena are? In the following I discuss one particular 
interpretation of the data–phenomena-distinction which one frequently finds in 
the philosophical literature. I will refer to this interpretation as the pattern view 
of scientific phenomena. This view is motivated on the one hand by the just 
mentioned melting point example and on the other hand by statements like the 
following from Woodward’s paper Data and Phenomena: 
The problem of detecting a phenomenon is the problem of detecting a signal 
in this sea of noise, of identifying a relatively stable and invariant pattern of 
some simplicity and generality with recurrent features—a pattern which is not 
just an artifact of the particular detection techniques we employ or the local 
environment in which we operate. Woodward (1989, p. 396) 
Authors like James McAllister (1997) or Bruce Glymour (2000) take state-
ments like this to assert that phenomena are or correspond to particular patterns 
in data sets. These patterns can typically be represented graphically, for exam-
ple by drawing a smooth curve through a set of data points. Patterns corre-
spond to phenomena in the sense that it is assumed that those patterns can be 
found not only in the examined samples but also in the whole population. For 
example it is assumed that not only the experimentally analyzed lead samples 
exhibit the pattern that lead melts at 327.46 ± 0.04◦C but every sample of lead 
will do so under appropriate circumstances. According to this view phenomena 
are what the statistician calls population statistics and the criterion for being a 
phenomenon which the pattern view invokes is therefore again an epistemic 
one, namely that knowledge about phenomena is gained exclusively by statisti-
cal interpretations of observable data.
3
 
                                                             
3At this point the question arises whether Bogen and Woodward themselves also endorse the 
pattern view. As I said, some authors suggest this, but to me this does not seem to be correct. 
This can be seen for example from the fact that Bogen and Woodward also regard weak neutral 
currents as a phenomenon (cf. for example Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 315). This obviously 
does not fit the pattern view. But I do not want to discuss exegetic questions here. For me it is 
enough that there are authors that endorse the pattern view interpretation to make it expedient to 
examine how well this suggestion works. 
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As aforementioned, one of the authors which endorse the pattern view interpre-
tation of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction is Bruce Glymour. This in turn 
leads him to the conclusion that the whole distinction between data and phe-
nomena is unnecessary and philosophically uninteresting. His objection against 
Bogen and Woodward is straightforward and runs as follows (cf. Glymour 
2000, pp. 33, 34): If phenomena are population statistics, then Bogen and 
Woodward simply give a new name to a well-known distinction from statistics. 
Instead of talking about sample and population statistics they just use the other 
words namely “data” and “phenomena”. Therefore, the data–phenomena-
distinction does not provide any new insights for philosophy of science and is 
for this reason nothing more than a superfluous and at the worst misleading 
terminological reform. 
In the remainder of this section I argue that the pattern view interpretation of 
Bogen and Woodward is misguided. Phenomena cannot be identified with 
patterns in data sets. I will elaborate on this by considering the first discovery 
of extrasolar planets. My thesis is that the existence of extrasolar planets 
should also be regarded as a scientific phenomenon although this phenomenon 
does not correspond to a pattern in a data set. En passant these considerations 
lead to a rejection of Glymour’s objection because his critique presupposes the 
pattern view interpretation. 
Extrasolar planets or, for short, exoplanets are planets outside of our solar sys-
tem. For a long time it was an open question whether there are planets orbiting 
other stars than our sun or not. Astronomers were interested in this question for 
different reason. One reason is of course that the correct answer could give us 
a hint whether there possibly exists life in other parts of the universe. A further 
important reason was that the detection of extrasolar planets would provide 
(and as a matter of fact did provide) strong evidence for certain astronomical 
theories about the formation of stars and planets. According to those theories 
the formation of planets is a typical by-product of the formation of stars and 
therefore there should be numerous exoplanets out there (cf. for example Caso-
li and Encrenaz 2007, pp. 91–116). 
If we now ask how the distinction between data and phenomena can be applied 
to the first detection of an exoplanet we have to reconsider the detection meth-
od by which the astronomers Michael Mayor and Didier Queloz discovered 
this planet. This method is called velocimetry and it depends on the measure-
ment of the radial velocity of the star 51 Pegasi (cf. Casoli and Encrenaz 2007, 
pp. 22–30). Radial velocity is the component of the velocity of a moving ob-
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ject whose vector points directly to the observer (or directly away from her).
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If one measures the temporal development of the radial velocity of 51 Pegasi 
one finds that it shows a periodical change over time. From this change astron-
omers infer the existence of an exoplanet which causes this change by its grav-
itational interaction with the star. If one takes a look at following figure from 
Mayor and Queloz’s original paper one seems to be confronted with a para-
digmatic case for the pattern view of phenomena (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1 Radial velocity change of 51 Pegasi (Mayor and Queloz 1995, p. 357) 
The figure displays a distribution of data points fitted by a sinus curve. This 
curve represents the periodical change of 51 Pegasi’s radial velocity and ac-
cording to the pattern view one should say that the only phenomenon Mayor 
and Queloz detected was this periodical change because it is the only thing 
which corresponds to a pattern in a data set. Against this I argue that it was 
another phenomenon Mayor and Queloz ultimately detected, namely the fact 
that 51 Pegasi is orbited by a planetary companion. Taking the existence of this 
exoplanet as a phenomenon can draw on the following reasons: 
                                                             
4 To be more precise: One actually measures the Doppler-shift of the light emitted from the star 
and infers from this to the radial velocity change. But because it does not make a difference to 
my argument I skip this intermediate step for the sake of simplicity. 
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First, this fact plays the roles which are characteristic for phenomena: it pro-
vides evidence for astronomical theories about planetary formation and on the 
other hand it is this fact that can be explained by those theories as soon as they 
become accepted.
5
 Second, the change of 51 Pegasi’s radial velocity in con-
trast to the existence of the exoplanet does not provide strong evidence for 
astronomers’ theories about planetary formation, because this change could 
also be brought about by causes different from the gravitational influence of 
the extrasolar planet. For example the very same pattern could have been 
caused by a pulsation of the star or by so-called spot rotation.
6
 Scientists are 
interested in evidence which provides good reasons for hypotheses and the 
pattern alone cannot provide such, because in order to possess good reasons 
one has to rule out the mentioned rival hypotheses. But in doing so one does 
nothing else than establishing the exoplanet hypothesis.
7
  
Third, treating the existence of extrasolar planets as a phenomenon fits very 
well with our everyday usage of the expression “phenomenon”. Here phenom-
ena are things that are surprising, noteworthy, sometimes exceptional and for 
which we would like to have an explanation—and in the end it was the exist-
ence of extrasolar planets what astronomers were really curious about and not 
the radial velocity pattern. 
Fourth—this point complements the third—for astronomers nothing hinged on 
the question which of the different available methods was used to establish the 
exoplanet’s existence. Other detection methods would have been as appropri-
ate as the one they actually applied, e.g., astrometrical or photometrical meth-
ods. But those methods would have brought about totally different kinds of 
data and consequently totally different kinds of patterns in data sets. 
I want to clarify, however, that I do not deny that the periodical change of 51 
Pegasi’s radial velocity is a scientific phenomenon; I only argue that the pat-
tern view is not universally valid. As the phenomenon of extrasolar planets 
reveals to identify a phenomenon we often have infer from patterns in data sets 
                                                             
5 As the following quote from a standard textbook on astrophysics illustrates also astronomers 
refer routinely to extrasolar planets or the fact that those exist as a phenomenon: “A proper 
understanding of phenomena like black holes, quasars and extrasolar planets requires that we 
understand all physics that underlies all of astrophysics.“ (Duric 2003, p. i). 
6 These are not mere theoretical possibilities invented by philosophers, who argue for some kind 
of underdetermination thesis, but real-life possibilities seriously considered by astronomers (cf. 
Mayor and Queloz 1995, pp. 357–358). 
7 This consideration points to certain insufficiencies of so-called positive relevance conceptions 
of evidence. Arguments that scientific evidence is indeed something over and above positive 
relevance can be found in Achinstein (2001, pp. 5–10). 
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like the periodical change of the radial velocity to the causes of these patterns 
like the orbiting of the exoplanet, which brings about this change. Therefore, I 
conclude that the notion of a scientific phenomenon cannot be adequately ex-
plicated by the pattern view. Furthermore it results from these considerations 
that Glymour’s way of arguing that the data–phenomena-distinction is super-
fluous is not convincing because his critique relied solely on the misguided 
pattern view. 
It should be noted, however, that this rebuttal of Glymour’s objection is built 
on the assumption that Bogen and Woodward really subscribe to a descriptive 
approach as I described it in the previous sections, because only in this case the 
deficiency of the pattern view interpretation inevitably makes Glymour’s cri-
tique lapse. On the contrary, if Bogen and Woodward were instead pursuing a 
stipulative approach Glymour might rightly call the relevance of their distinc-
tion into question. This gives a further, indirect reason to understand Bogen 
and Woodward as pursuing the former type of approach. 
5. Theories and claims about phenomena: a contextual  
approach 
What we found out in the preceding sections is that analyses which tie the no-
tion of a scientific phenomenon to our ways of epistemic access to the relevant 
entities are not convincing. As a matter of fact science often deals with phe-
nomena which are neither directly observable nor statistically inferred patterns 
in data sets. In this last step I discuss a question which results from the fact that 
none of the proposed epistemic criteria proved as universally valid to specify 
what phenomena are. This question is how phenomena and claims about phe-
nomena are related to theories. Which of the claims scientists make are de-
scriptions of phenomena and which are theoretical accounts for those phenom-
ena? 
In a first approximation the relation between theories and phenomena is some-
thing like this: According to the syntactic view presenting a theory is stating a 
few, maybe quite abstract axioms which form a deductive system. By feeding 
some additional information into this system for example certain boundary 
conditions we can derive theorems from these axioms. At least some of those 
theorems are then the parts of the theory which correspond to phenomena. On 
the rival semantic view, in turn, presenting a theory is presenting a family of 
(set theoretic) models. Those models or at least substructures of them corre-
spond to phenomena. Thus, on both accounts phenomena correspond to sub-
structures of the whole theoretical structure. But which substructures exactly 
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correspond to phenomena? While discussing this question I will adopt the fol-
lowing manner of speaking: I will describe substructures which correspond to 
phenomena as claims about phenomena and the rest of the theoretical structure 
as theoretical claims. By adopting this terminology I do not want to imply that 
my considerations are only valid if one follows the syntactic view. Rather I 
think that they hold independently from which conception of theories one pre-
fers. My mode of speaking is a mere terminological convention which I adopt 
because it corresponds to Bogen and Woodward’s parlance. 
I will argue that there is no clear-cut, context-independent criterion by which 
claims about phenomena and theoretical claims can be distinguished. Rather 
claims about phenomena are a subset of the theoretical claims to which we 
adopt special epistemic attitudes. This thesis constitutes a difference to the yet 
discussed conceptions of scientific phenomena. According to those there is a 
clear-cut distinction between claims about phenomena and theoretical claims. 
A proponent of the traditional view simply draws the distinction this way: The 
claim “Coffee cups fall to the ground when they drop from the table.” is a 
claim about a phenomenon, because we can observe accordant states of affairs. 
In turn all claims in which unobservable entities figure have to be considered 
as theoretical, for example the claim “There is a gravitational force specified 
by Newton’s law of gravitation which makes the coffee cup fall”.8 An analo-
gous distinction can be drawn for the pattern view with respect to claims about 
patterns in data sets. 
But if one does not want to stick to one of these problematic views it is no 
longer clear which claims of science belong to mere descriptions of phenome-
na and which belong to theory. Nevertheless, Bogen and Woodward also sug-
gest that there is a clear-cut distinction between both, but they draw it on dif-
ferent grounds. According to them, only theoretical claims have the potential 
to provide scientific explanations of claims about phenomena while claims 
about phenomena only figure as explananda but not as explanantia. Data, phe-
nomena and theories can therefore be distinguished by the kinds of explanatory 
relations between them: 
– Claims about data do not explain and are not explained. They are neither 
explananda nor explanantia. 
                                                             
8 This does not presuppose a distinction between observational and theoretical vocabulary. The 
only relevant point is whether the sentence refers to observable or unobservable entities (cf. van 
Fraassen 1980, p. 15). 
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– Claims about phenomena are explained by theories but do not explain 
claims about data. They are explananda but no explanantia. 
– Theoretical claims explain claims about phenomena and can be explained 
by other theoretical claims. They are explanantia but can also be ex-
plananda. 
The basic idea can again be illustrated by the melting point example. The melt-
ing point of lead can be explained by physical theory, be it thermodynamics or 
a theory about the atomic bindings in solid state bodies. But these theories and 
also the phenomenon of the melting point of lead itself cannot be invoked to 
explain the individual data points. They do not explain why we measured one 
time 326.8°C and the other time 327.1°C. 
But is the proposed distinctive criterion that claims about phenomena, in con-
trast to theoretical claims, are not used to provide scientific explanations really 
feasible? Consider for example the phenomenon of extrasolar planets and an 
accordant claim about this phenomenon: 
P1: The star 51 Pegasi is orbited by a planetary companion. 
This phenomenon is inferred as a cause of the periodical change of the radial 
velocity and therefore it can of course be invoked to explain this periodical 
change. For example envisage a student of astronomy who has basis 
knowledge in physics and astrophysics but does not know why the radial ve-
locity change occurs. It is obvious that you can explain the change to him by 
referring to the phenomenon that there is an exoplanet orbiting the star. Conse-
quently claims about phenomena can very well provide explanations for other 
phenomena and are in this respect on a par with theoretical claims.
9
 
Furthermore, it is not even clear whether claims about phenomena really do 
not explain data or at least aspects of them. In order to discuss this, consider 
the following sentences: 
P2: Lead melts (under such and such circumstances) at 327.46±0.04°C. 
X: In this experiment (consisting in a series of measurements of melt-
ing temperatures of lead samples with a certain measuring instrument) 
the arithmetic mean of the melting temperatures was 326.43°C. 
                                                             
9 Note that this is not an idiosyncrasy of the exoplanet case but holds true for many other phe-
nomena, for example for phenomena of atomic and subatomic physics. E.g., the phenomenon of 
weak neutral currents can be invoked in the very same manner to explain the central characteris-
tics of bubble chamber trails. 
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X is a description of a certain aspect of experimental data because X is explic-
itly bound to an experimental context. Being bound to specific experimental 
contexts is a characteristic of data and not of phenomena. But contrary to Bo-
gen and Woodward, I think that can P2 provide an explanation of X. 
This is so because explanations typically involve a contextually determined 
contrast class and there are at least some contrast-classes with respect to which 
P2 is explanatory. E.g., if one asks for an explanation of the fact that we found 
in this particular experiment a mean value of 326.43°C and not of, say, 370°C 
one could respond to this question by stating P2 and adding that the experi-
mental situation to which X refers approximately meets the circumstances 
specified in P2. Maybe one might want to call into question whether this is 
really an explanation, but such doubts can be allayed. Admittedly the given 
explanation is not a very deep one, but nevertheless it is explanatory at least in 
a minimal sense. Explanations are answers to why questions, they are requests 
for certain pieces of information. And stating that every sample of lead has the 
dispositional property of melting at 327.46 ± 0.04°C under appropriate circum-
stances can provide the requested information in an appropriate context. Just 
think of other materials like paraffin (a certain type of wax) which do not have 
a single melting point. A comparison with this case makes plausible that the 
average melting behavior of certain lead samples, i.e., experimental data, can 
very well be explained by referring to the stable melting point of lead. If lead 
would not have this property we would have measured different data which 
most likely would not have been normally distributed. In this sense there is a 
pattern of counterfactual dependency between the statistical properties of the 
considered data set and property of having a melting point of 327.46 ± 0.04°C. 
According to Woodward’s own account on explanation, explanatory relations 
are grounded exactly in such patterns of counterfactual dependency (cf. 
Woodward and Hitchcock 2003, p. 11). These considerations provides further 
reason to assume that claims about phenomena can as well as theoretical 
claims figure as explanantia. 
Therefore, I conclude that the suggestion of a clear-cut, context-independent 
distinction between claims about phenomena and theoretical claims is untena-
ble. Rather theories seem to be nothing else than putative descriptions of phe-
nomena. Our theory of atomic bindings, for example, describes phenomena of 
atomic binding and states relations between the different phenomena it de-
scribes. Why do we then sometimes refer to a certain state of affairs as a phe-
nomenon while we are in other cases more reluctant to do so? There certainly 
are cases in which we are more likely to say things like that our description of 
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a certain states of affairs is ‘just’ a theoretical hypothesis and not a claim about 
a phenomenon. 
This indicates that we regard certain states of affairs as phenomena if we adopt 
a special epistemic attitude towards these states of affairs. Denoting a state of 
affairs as a phenomenon expresses that (additional to the ascription of two 
roles identified in Sect. 2) one assumes to have good reasons for accepting a 
corresponding claim which describes this state of affairs. Phenomena are state 
of affairs which we accept as given in a certain context. And this is the case if 
the claim figures as highly probable given our experimental data and accepted 
background knowledge. If we talk about the phenomenon of exoplanets or the 
phenomenon of weak neutral currents we accept the claims that there are ex-
oplanets orbiting stars and that there are weak neutral currents in certain parti-
cle interactions. 
Consequently there is no difference in principle between theoretical claims and 
claims about phenomena; rather there is just a contextual determined differ-
ence. To be more specific I claim that one should distinguish between strongly 
accepted claims of science, which are claims about phenomena, and claims 
which are less strong accepted. These claims one might call “theoretical hy-
pothesis”. Claims about phenomena and theoretical hypothesis together make 
the whole set of theoretical claims. A claim can be regarded as theoretical hy-
pothesis in one and as a claim about a phenomenon in another context, for 
example when a change in background theory or the acquisition of new exper-
imental data raises (or lowers) our acceptance of the claim. 
That our epistemic attitudes determine whether something is a phenomenon 
squares well with the two roles of phenomena which were identified in Sect. 2: 
Something we accept in a strong manner is of course more appropriate to pro-
vide evidence for further hypotheses than something we are not so sure of. An 
analogous point holds true for the explanandum role: we only ask for an expla-
nation if we have good reasons for accepting the explanandum-sentence. Thus, 
the notion of a phenomenon is a contextual concept which can be characterized 
in the following manner: 
(i) States of affairs can be regarded as phenomena only if they play certain 
roles in science: They have to be potential evidence for and potential ex-
plananda of further scientific claims. 
(ii) Claims about such states of affairs are judged as claims about phenome-
na only if there are sufficiently good reasons to accept those claims. 
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There are no further restrictions on states affairs in order to qualify as phenom-
ena. In particular there is no restriction regarding our way of epistemic access 
to the relevant states of affairs. There are various ways by which we can ac-
quire knowledge about phenomena. Some phenomena can be directly observed 
like the phenomenon that the heaven is blue or that lead melts if you heat it 
strongly, some correspond to patterns in data sets like the melting point of lead 
or the periodical change of the radial velocity of 51 Pegasi and some we infer 
as causes of such patterns like the phenomenon of extrasolar planets or the 
existence of weak neutral currents. 
6. Data, phenomena and constructive empiricism 
In the last section of this paper I want to shift the focus from the analysis of the 
meaning of the expression “phenomenon” as it is used in scientific discourse to 
the question whether we can gain something for the philosophical meta-
discourse about science from the distinction between data and phenomena. 
Here I will focus on epistemological issues related to the scientific realism 
debate and argue that at least in this particular field we do not gain new in-
sights from the distinction. Bogen and Woodward by contrast claim that van 
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, arguably the most prominent rival account 
to scientific realism in contemporary philosophy of science, is unable to ac-
commodate the distinction between data and phenomena into its theoretical 
framework (cf. Bogen and Woodward 1988, pp. 349–352; Woodward 1989, 
pp. 450–452). 
At the heart of constructive empiricism lies the notion of empirical adequacy. 
The aim of science according to constructive empiricism is to find empirically 
adequate theories, i.e., theories which make true statements about the observa-
ble. But in contrast to the scientific realist the constructive empiricist holds the 
view that we should be agnostic with regard to the truth-value of scientific 
claims about the unobservable parts of the world. Bogen and Woodward object 
that the consideration of the distinction between data and phenomena renders 
van Fraassen’s construal of empirical adequacy implausible. They write: 
Empirical adequacy, as we understand it, means that a theory must “save” or 
“be adequate to” the phenomena, which for the most part are not observed, ra-
ther than the data which are observed. By contrast, van Fraassen requires that 
theories save or be adequate to what can be observed. This is tantamount to 
requiring that a theory must save the data—that an acceptable theory of mo-
lecular structure, in Nagel’s example [i.e., the melting point example; J.A.], 
must fit the observed scatter of thermometer readings, rather than the true 
melting point of lead which is inferred from these readings. We have argued 
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at length that this is an unreasonable requirement to impose on any theory. It 
seems unlikely that van Fraassen could accept our notion of empirical ade-
quacy without abandoning many of his most central claims. Bogen and 
Woodward (1988, p. 351) 
To my knowledge van Fraassen nowhere reacts to this challenge, but prima 
facie there seem to be two options he could take in order to maintain construc-
tive empiricism. The first option would be to argue that the data–phenomena-
distinction shows that the realm of the unobservable is larger than commonly 
expected. Despite what one intuitively thought Bogen and Woodward have 
shown that also phenomena like the melting point of lead are in fact unobserv-
able and the constructive empiricist has to bite the bullet: She also has to be 
agnostic with regard to the truth-value of claims about those phenomena just as 
well as in the case of any claim in which unobservable entities figure. 
But taking this option cannot be satisfying for van Fraassen because he claims 
that his position gives an as adequate account of scientific practice as scientific 
realism. That means in particular that its determination of the aim of science 
should be coherent with actual scientific practice. Indeed his position is advo-
cated by van Fraassen as the “equilibrium point” between epistemic modesty 
and adequacy to science (Monton and van Fraassen 2003, p. 407; cf. also Berg-
Hildebrand and Suhm 2006). But if it is the case that science is mostly con-
cerned with unobservable phenomena and that there are virtually no observable 
phenomena at all then this casts serious doubts on van Fraassen’s claim that it 
is the aim of science to find empirically adequate theories, if empirical ade-
quate theories are understood as theories which make true statements about 
data. Hence, if van Fraassen really were committed to taking this option the 
data–phenomena-distinction would indeed show that constructive empiricism 
does not meet the criterion of adequacy to science, which van Fraassen himself 
imposes. 
But, as I will argue in the remainder of this paper, there also is a second option 
according to which van Fraassen is in not committed to such a narrow under-
standing of empirical adequacy but should better construe this notion in a way 
such that it includes patterns in data sets. 
The defense of van Fraassen’s position goes like this: Van Fraassen readily 
concedes that nearly every claim about a phenomenon involves more than pure 
observation but also some kind of inference. This can be seen from the fact 
that constructive empiricism contains a commitment to the truth about the ob-
servable and not just about the observed. This step already involves some ob-
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servation-transcending inference and van Fraassen is willing to take the epis-
temic risk involved this ampliative inference in order to meet the adequacy to 
science criterion. Analogously to these observed-observable inferences he can 
further concede that the adequacy to science criterion also requires the ac-
ceptance of inferences by which we move from data to patterns in data sets. 
Nevertheless he can still maintain that those inferences involve a lesser degree 
of epistemic risk than inferences to phenomena involving unobservable enti-
ties. Everything one needs to establish the melting point of lead are observable 
data about melting temperatures of observable lead samples, assumptions 
about the absence of systematic error and statistical methods of data analysis.
10
 
But those assumptions and mathematical inferences, so van Fraassen might 
argue, do not increase epistemic risk in the same way as theoretical inferences 
to the existence of unobservable entities like electrons do, because they do not 
involve any specific physical theory to license the observation transcending 
step; in particular they do not involve any new ontological commitments (Cf. 
van Fraassen and his coauthors in Ladyman et al. 1997, p. 317, for a similar 
line of argument). Contrary to Bogen and Woodward’s objection, such an ar-
gumentation enables him to stretch the notion of empirical adequacy in a way 
that it covers patterns in data sets while his position is still epistemically more 
modest than scientific realism. Furthermore, it seems as if van Fraassen al-
ready endorses such a broad understanding of empirical adequacy anyway 
when he writes: 
The whole point of having theoretical models is that they should fit the phe-
nomena, that is, fit the models of the data. van Fraassen (1985, p. 271) 
Here he refers to phenomena explicitly as “models of data”, a terminus intro-
duced by Patrick Suppes (1962). But those are nothing else than what was 
called patterns in data sets in this paper. Hence, the practice of saving the phe-
nomena (in van Fraassen’s sense) might very well include patterns in data sets 
and at the same time exclude states of affairs in which unobservable entities 
figure. 
It is worth noting that, contrary to what Bogen and Woodward claim, such a 
broad understanding of empirical adequacy is still in accordance with its defi-
nition as truth in regard to the observable. That phenomena which correspond 
to patterns in data sets are often not observed but inferred does by no means 
entail that those phenomena are unobservable. Rather, under appropriate cir-
                                                             
10 Remember that van Fraassen has no quarrels with the claim that also our observational vocab-
ulary is theory-infected (cf. van Fraassen 1980, p. 14). 
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cumstances, i.e. in the absence of all confounding factors, we would observe, 
e.g., lead samples melting exactly at their melting temperature. This case is 
perfectly analogous to the fact that dinosaurs are observable because we would 
observe dinosaurs under appropriate observation conditions regardless of 
whether we are de facto able to realize those conditions. 
In summary, nothing about the distinction between data and phenomena debars 
the empiricist from claiming that we should have different epistemic commit-
ments with regard to different types of phenomena depending on whether the 
accordant states of affairs involve observable or unobservable entities. There 
may be other reasons why there are no epistemological significant differences 
between both kinds of phenomena but such reasons would be independent of 
the data–phenomena-distinction. 
7. Concluding remarks 
My appraisal of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction between data and phe-
nomena yielded two main results. The first result is a clarification of the notion 
of a scientific phenomenon. I argued that ways of understanding the notion 
which specified phenomena via the way we gain knowledge about them were 
not able to account for the characteristic features of the notion in scientific 
parlance. It is neither an essential property of phenomena to be observable, as 
the traditional view claims, nor is it that phenomena solely correspond to un-
observable patterns statistically inferred from data sets, as the pattern view has 
it. A broader reading of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction which also allows 
for the inclusion of, e.g., the phenomenon of extrasolar planets seemed to pro-
vide a more promising attempt to capture the notion’s meaning but seemed at 
the same time to be connected with an unclear distinction between claims 
about phenomena and theoretical claims. In order to deal with this difficulty I 
provided an analysis which does not specify the notion by connecting it to a 
special way of epistemic access to phenomena but rather by the roles of scien-
tific phenomena in scientific practice and by our epistemic attitudes towards 
claims about phenomena. 
The second result is an evaluation of the epistemological significance of Bogen 
and Woodward’s distinction for the debate between scientific realists and con-
structive empiricists. The upshot of this investigation is that the distinction 
does not provide any convincing arguments for this debate. 
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